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How should psychological scientists think about emotion in the law? Although the study of affect 
and motivation in information processing models has captured the attention of many who think 
about social cognition, judgment, and decision making (see Brewer & Hewstone (2004) for a re-
view of current ideas), the impact of this thinking has only begun to make its way into research 
and theory in legal psychology. The special edition of Law and Human Behavior on this topic 
showcases some of the more recent attempts to apply emotion to legal analysis and psycholegal 
research (Bornstein & Wiener, 2006), but even these articles leave open the more general prob-
lem of how psychological researchers can and should infuse observer affect into their studies of 
legal decision making. Here, we offer an approach that mixes theories of emotion into standard 
models of judgment and decision making and then show how our approach can offer new in-
sights into understanding some traditional areas of legal psychology. The paper begins by tracing 
some distinctions that social cognitive researchers make about emotion and then proceeds to use 
them to modify two existing models of judgment and decision making. We show how infusing 
affect into the rational actor and lens models of decision making can offer new and interesting 
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insights with examples from jury decision making, obedience to the law, and eyewitness identifi -
cation. We conclude by arguing that mixing affect into studies of legal decision making promises 
to be a heuristic process in the most general sense of legal decision making. 
Judgment and decision making in the law is emotional 
This paper does not offer a new model of legal decision making. Instead, it examines two old-
er approaches, the rational actor and the lens models (see Hastie & Dawes (2001)) suggesting 
ways in which we can stretch and pull them to accommodate the very real but often neglect-
ed reality of the emotional context that precedes, surrounds, and follows judgments and deci-
sions in law and legal process. Although psycholegal researchers have applied cognitive, de-
velopmental, social, and most recently social cognitive theories to study the manner in which 
judges, jurors, attorneys, police, litigants, and citizens make decisions and judgments required, 
or at least, encouraged in the law, they have done so largely in an emotional vacuum. Perhaps 
it is because the law demands an objective standard for evaluations of responsibility, culpabili-
ty, liability, punishment, and damages that legal psychologists studying judgment and decision 
making have all but ignored emotion, mood, and motivation in their work. Although there is an 
occasional conceptual nod in the theoretical literature or an equally rare effort at measuring or 
manipulating affective variables in the empirical literature, most studies of legal decision mak-
ing treat emotion (and motivation) as unwanted intruders in the objective world of weighing 
inputs and throughputs to reach one of a very few permissible outputs. 
This state of our science might ring untrue to the experts in the fi eld (i.e., judges, lawyers, po-
lice, and litigants) because they naturally expect emotion to be an important factor in how people 
make legal judgments. If so, then one potential answer to these skeptics could be that the emo-
tional and motivational states that people experience have little infl uence on their evaluations of 
facts and evidence, and that such states do not alter the way in which people understand and ap-
ply the law. However, in its current state, our science has precious little to say about the impor-
tance of mood and emotion in the problems of law and legal process. At the same time, oth-
er judgment and decision researchers have acknowledged the role of affect in their empirical 
work and have modifi ed existing models to take into account the possible infl uence of mood and 
emotion in human choice and inference (for reviews, see Brewer & Hewstone, 2004; Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001). Before we apply either the rational actor model or the lens model to the problem 
of legal judgment and decision making, we fi nd it useful to consider some very specifi c ways in 
which the affective world of decision makers might infl uence their conclusions. 
Anticipated and experienced emotion 
First, judges, jurors, attorneys, experts, eyewitnesses, litigants, police, and everyday citizens 
anticipate the emotional consequences (both pleasant and unpleasant) that are likely to fol-
low from their choices, decisions, and inferences. They undoubtedly are aware of the impact 
that their judgments could have not only for themselves but also for the other signifi cant legal 
actors that defi ne the context in which the decision makers reach their conclusions. Research 
shows that people choose those outcomes that they believe will produce the most positive emo-
tional consequences for themselves. For example, Mellers and her colleagues (Mellers, 2000; 
Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999) have demonstrated 
that in a variety of decision tasks (e.g., fi nancial gambles, seeking feedback on test scores and 
pregnancy tests), anticipated pleasure supplemented the logic of rational decision making (i.e., 
expected utility logic) in real world and laboratory choices. Translating to the current prob-
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lem, people who anticipate experiencing a pleasant mood after making a legal choice or judg-
ment will be more likely to choose in favor of the outcome that they believe will produce that 
emotional state. Those who anticipate experiencing an unpleasant mood (such as regret, an-
ger, or disappointment) will be less likely to choose the same outcome. It is likely that legal 
actors also take into consideration the emotional outcomes that others are likely to experience 
as a result of their decisions. This suggests that the emotions that legal decision makers antici-
pate when they contemplate their conclusions will mediate the effect of evidence, information, 
and data on their fi nal deliberations and judgments. Prior research shows that the infl uence of 
anticipated emotion can override rational decision making when the mood analysis disagrees 
with a purely cognitive rule (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). 
Even more radical, in the sense that it deviates sharply from an objective model of legal 
choice, is a second hypothesis that emotions experienced at the time of a judgment can help 
determine decisions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) and direct behavior, just as 
anticipated emotion does. The experienced emotion need not result from the stimuli before 
the decision maker; rather, it can arise from internal or external factors incidental to the task. 
However, it is diffi cult to override the emotional infl uence of vivid materials in legal contexts 
(Bornstein & Nemeth, 1999); therefore, only rare individuals can ignore their own emotion-
al reactions to the facts in a specifi c civil or criminal dispute. It follows that researchers who 
study the role of emotion in legal decision making must consider both the preexisting emotion-
al state of the evaluator as well as the emotion that decision makers naturally experience after 
reviewing the facts of an actual or potential dispute. Most importantly, the emotional induce-
ments that unavoid ably accompany the facts in a legal dispute most likely interact with the 
preexisting emotional state of the decision makers, which themselves result from either dispo-
sitional characteristics of the evaluators or the situational context in which the decision mak-
ers fi nd themselves. The problem of experienced emotion at the time of the decision is indeed 
a complicated one (see, e.g. Feigenson & Park, 2006; Maroney, 2006). 
Until recently, the social psychological research literature suggested that people engage in 
more thorough and systematic information processing when they experience negative, com-
pared to positive, mood states (Batra & Stayman, 1990; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; 
Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Murray, Surjan, Hirt, & Surjan, 
1990; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, Bless, & Strack, 1991; Sinclair & Mark, 1992; Worth & Mack-
ie, 1987). However, some studies report fi ndings contrary to the “negative mood” effect (Isen, 
1993; Parrott & Sabini, 1990; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). In part, to explain these fi ndings, 
Lerner and Keltner developed appraisal-tendency theory, in which cognitive appraisals differen-
tiate between emotions beyond the simple valence dimension (i.e., positive vs. negative mood). 
It suggests that the specifi c emotions that decision makers experience through direct contact with 
the “to be judged” stimuli, or that they incidentally bring to the task, impact judgments and de-
cisions. Accordingly, emotions focus attention, memory, and behavior about the current environ-
mental task and carry over to shape responses to novel situations. Among the studies of cognitive 
appraisal effects in social judgments (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, 
& Fischhoff, 2003), those that are most central to the current paper are Smith and Ellsworth’s 
(1985) early work and Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) later application. 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) asked participants to recall 15 events in their lives in which they 
experienced each of 15 emotions, and then to rate those events on emotional dimensions. Fac-
tor analysis and multidimensional scaling retrieved six orthogonal dimensions from the emo-
tion ratings. These emotion appraisal dimensions were pleasantness, anticipated effort, certain-
ty, attentional activity, self-other responsibility, and situational control Smith and Ellsworth. 
In a series of four experiments, Tiedens and Linton (2001) extended these fi ndings by using 
two of these dimensions, pleasantness and certainty, to untangle the mood and judgment liter-
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ature with its inconsistent negative mood effect. Some pleasant emotions (e.g., happiness and 
contentment) and unpleasant emotions (e.g., anger and disgust) convey a sense of certainty, 
whereas other pleasant emotions (hope and surprise) and unpleasant emotions (fear and wor-
ry) convey uncer tainty. Still other emotions (sadness) fall in the middle of the certain—uncer-
tain continuum. In one study, participants wrote about an autobiographical event that they re-
membered and mentally relived, which made them feel anger, contentment, worry, or surprise. 
This emotional induction crossed the variables of emotional valence and certainty. Later, par-
ticipants read an essay osten sibly written by a student or an expert professor, which argued that 
grade infl ation was on the rise and therefore professors should evaluate college students’ per-
formances more critically. Results showed that relative to the student essay, the expert essay 
persuaded students more, but only in the certain emotion conditions (anger and contentment), 
and not in the uncertain emotion conditions (worry or surprise). There were no differences for 
the pleasantness of the emotions. This and three other experiments demonstrated that specifi c 
mood states determine people’s level of certainty, such that when certainty is low they will ex-
ert more effort in processing (to regain a sense of certainty) and will not be infl uenced by sur-
face or stereotypical cues. However, when their levels of certainty are high they process heu-
ristically so that surface and stereotypical cues are more infl uential what Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993, call the “suffi ciency threshold hypothesis”). Trans lating to legal decision making, we an-
ticipate that surface or heuristic thinking should fl ourish when legal actors are certain and pro-
cess less systematically. Therefore, heuristic thinking should be elevated for angry legal actors 
(high in certainty) relative to fearful ones (low in certainty) (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Affect infusion model, affect as information, and affect as primes 
Although we fi nd the distinction between anticipated and experienced emotion a useful one 
for understanding legal decision making, other distinctions offer analogous but slightly dif-
ferent approaches. Forgas developed a model that incorporates mood states into decision 
processes, which could infl uence the outcomes of judgment and choice in legal contexts. 
The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) predicts mood effects for tasks requiring open thinking 
and the interpretation of ambiguous information (i.e., almost all legal judgments and choic-
es) as compared to those that are routine or guided by other goals. As a result, the AIM pre-
dicts that affect infusion will occur most during heuristic and substantive processing and 
least during direct access and motivated processing (Forgas, 1995). 
One way in which affect infuses evaluations during substantive processing is through the 
indirect route of affective priming. Affective priming occurs when affect infl uences atten-
tion, encoding, retrieval, or associative processes (Forgas, 1995). There is an abundance of 
research that supports affective priming and demonstrates mood congruent effects in evalua-
tions of social behavior (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984), persuasive messages (Petty, Glei-
cher, & Baker, 1991), and causal inferences (Forgas, Bower, & Moyan, 1990). For exam-
ple, Forgas et al. (1990) demonstrated that happy participants were more likely than were 
sad participants to credit success to internal causes and credit failures to external causes. The 
infl uence of mood upon interpretations of causality is particularly relevant to legal decision 
making (e.g., negligence judgments) in which litigants, attorneys, judges, and ultimately ju-
rors attribute responsibility to injurious conduct. 
With regard to heuristic processing, the AIM relies on affect-as-information theory to ex-
plain how affect infusion occurs during heuristic processing. The affect-as-information theo-
ry posits that affect infl uences evaluations when evaluators, lacking cognitive capacity, sim-
ply ask them selves “How do I feel about it?” instead of computing a judgment on the basis 
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of features of the target (Schwarz, 1990). As a result, individuals may mistake feelings be-
cause of a preexisting state as a reaction to the target Schwarz. In a classic study, Schwarz 
and Clore (1983) found that participants interviewed on a sunny day were in better moods 
and were more likely to give positive evaluations than were participants interviewed on a 
rainy day, if the interviewers did not make participants aware that the true source of their 
moods was the weather. Another theory that explains the infl uence of emotion upon evalua-
tions closely related to affect-as-information is the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
& MacGregor, 2002), which also proposes that affective associations are stored in memory 
for later use in decision making. In this manner, the affect heuristic provides a resource for 
individuals to consult in the process of making de cisions. This affective route can be faster 
and easier than weighing the pros and cons of legal arguments. 
Evidence supporting this theory has demonstrated that emotion can directly infl uence risk eval-
uations. Previous research has found that perceptions of risks and benefi ts are positively correlated 
in the real world but individuals perceive risks and benefi ts as negatively correlated. Further, the 
extent to which individuals perceive this inverse relationship is correlated with the strength of the 
positive and negative affect that is associated with the target activity (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). 
Building on this research, Finucane, Alhakami, Slovice, and Johnson (2000) provided participants 
with four kinds of information designed to manipulate affect by increasing or decreasing perceived 
benefi ts and risks. Results demonstrated that participants provided with information about the ben-
efi ts of an activity in turn had increased positive affect and ultimately this led to decreased percep-
tions of risk. By contrast, participants provided with information about the risks of an activity de-
veloped negative affect, which in turn led to increased perceptions of risk. 
From a legal perspective, we have found in our own work on judgments about sexual ha-
rassment that the affective heuristic explains well the effects of incidental (induced) emotion, 
as well as emotion arising from the to-be-judged stimulus material. Voss and Wiener (2006) 
examined how emotion infl uenced participants’ use of extra-legal factors (i.e., complainant’s 
behavior unrelated to the alleged harassing episodes) and legal factors (i.e., the unwelcome-
ness, severity, and pervasiveness of the conduct) when determining if harassment had occurred 
in videotape reenactments of two legally infl uential sexual harassment cases, Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton (1998)and Rabidue v. Osceola Refi ning Co.(1986). In Study 1, participants rated 
their experienced emotion after viewing the videotape but in Study 2 we induced participants 
to feel anger, fear, or no emotion by writing about an autobiographical event. In both studies, 
participants viewed two videotapes depicting workplace situations and determined if sexual 
harassment had occurred. Depending upon the condition, the complainant in the fi rst videotape 
behaved either in an aggressive or neutral manner toward other workers (prime), whereas the 
complainant in the second videotape always behaved in a neutral manner. We predicted that 
the priming manipulation in the fi rst videotape would carry over or prime perceptions of the 
second tape. The extent of the priming effect was an indication of participants’ reliance upon 
the complainant’s behavior to decide if sexual harassment had occurred. 
Results for both studies indicated that as participants experienced increased levels of emo-
tion, they relied less on both the legal factors and the prime in making their decision. Spe-
cifi cally, prime and emotion interactions revealed that increased ratings of harassment were 
associated with the hostile prime as compared to the neutral prime for those participants expe-
riencing low levels of emotion. We interpreted these results to suggest that participants expe-
riencing low levels of emotion and exposed to the hostile prime were more upset by the prime 
(the complainant’s behavior) and this increased the complainant’s credibility. In other words, 
the complainant’s hostile behavior led participants to take her complaint more seriously and as 
a result rate the likelihood of harassment as higher. By contrast, participants viewing the hos-
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tile complainant who were already experiencing high levels of emotion did not make this inter-
pretation because their emotion levels were already high and their perceptions of harassment 
were similarly elevated. Therefore, the allegations only increase perceptions of the likelihood 
of harassment when they are accompanied by an emotional impact. Observers seemed to refer 
to their own emotional arousal level to determine whether a hostile work environment existed 
in the workplace. This emotional impact can come in the form of incidental inducement, reac-
tion to the episode, or in reaction to a hostile complainant herself. 
Incorporating affect into legal decision making models 
There is indeed a rich literature on affect in social cognition, which researchers may draw 
upon to enhance their insights of information processing in the law. However, to bridge the lit-
eratures in social cognition and legal psychology we need mechanisms to tie together affect 
and judgment in ways that offer insights about legal processes. Regardless of whether legal 
psychologists adopt the anticipated versus experienced emotion didactic, the AIM, the primed 
affect construct, or the affect as information analysis, it is necessary to fi t affect theory and 
fi ndings into existing information processing models of legal decision-making. The two ap-
proaches at the foundation of legal decision making, which offer platforms for understanding 
emotion in the law are the rational choice model and the lens model (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). 
The rational choice model 
Korobkin and Ulen (1998, 2000) in their analysis of the law and economics movement identi-
fi ed as the chief tenets of the rational choice approach the principle that people respond to in-
centives, and that skillful policy makers can use the law to encourage socially desirable con-
duct and discourage the undesirable. People acting under the boundaries and constraints of 
law weigh the costs and benefi ts of following the law against the same for not following the 
law. Further, the law encourages effi cient use of social resources and discourages the waste-
ful use of those same resources. In the recent past, legal scholars used the effi ciency principle 
to suggest similarly that tort and other civil law claims achieve settlements that favor those for 
whom the gains are most valued, and disfavor those who value the gains least (Landes & Pos-
ner, 1987). Landes and Posner used the logic of economics to illustrate how the theory of in-
centives and the principle of effi ciency justify the existing common law rules, which make up 
contemporary tort law doctrines. Other law and economics authors use these same basic prin-
ciples to explain and justify areas of jurisprudence in both the criminal and civil law in accor-
dance with accepted doctrine Korobkin and Ulen (Monahan & Walker, 2002, p.26). 
Rational choice theory is the driving force of the law and economics movement. According 
to decision theorists Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 18), a rational choice must meet four criteria. 
First, a decision maker bases a rational choice solely on assets at the time of the decision, which 
include not only fi nancial assets but also the nature of the decision maker’s “physiological state, 
psychological capacities, social relationships, and feelings.” The decision maker values these as-
sets and acts in ways to increase, or at least, maintain them. Second, the rational decision mak-
er takes into consideration the consequences of choices with respect to the status of the decision 
maker’s extant assets (physical and psychological). Third, under conditions of uncertainty the 
rules of probability describe the way in which decision makers evaluate the likelihood of con-
sequences that will infl uence the distribution of these assets. This is not to suggest that decision 
makers apply formal calculations to reach optimal outcomes. Instead, decision makers are intui-
tive statisticians whose subjective probability estimates are congruent with the basic and funda-
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mental tenets of probability theory. Finally, the driving force in decision-making is adaptation. 
Accordingly, decision makers reach decisions within the constraints of the probabilities of con-
sequences and the values or satisfactions that stem from the possible outcomes of choice. In the 
language of Judge Posner, “man is a rational maximizer of his ends” (Posner, 1997, p.24). 
The expected utility model of rational choice puts more meat on the bare bones of the ra-
tional maximizer. Korobkin and Ulen (2000) write about a decision in which there are two 
choices, each with an uncertain probability, and the task for the decision maker is to se-
lect one choice over the other. Each choice leads to multiple possible outcomes and each of 
those outcomes is associated with a change in assets that is either valued or devalued. The 
choice would be simple if the consequences of the outcomes were certain but in the real 
world, the consequences are usually uncertain, best described as probability statements as-
sociated with the outcomes and their consequences. According to decision analysts, the ra-
tional solution to selecting a choice is to estimate the expected utility of each choice and 
then select the choice with the highest expected utility. In other words, the adaptive ap-
proach is to conduct a cost–benefi t analysis for each choice and then adopt the choice that 
maximizes the likelihood of a positive change in one’s assets.1 
The Hastie and Dawes (2001) approach to rational choice broadens the rational choice 
model to include the role of mood, affect, and emotion broadly defi ned in conscious and 
unconscious choice strategies. In other words, the decision maker estimates the utility of 
the potential outcome, in part, by weighing the likelihood of each outcome by the antici-
pated emotional reaction (positive or negative) that the decision maker expects to experi-
ence with each outcome. The decision maker’s own reaction will be a function of experi-
ence with the outcomes in question, experience with similar outcomes, and estimates of the 
affect associated with these outcomes for both the self and others. In fact, one could con-
template a judgment strategy that balanced the emotion that the decision maker anticipat-
ed for the self with the emotion that the decision maker anticipated others would feel after 
the judgment. In sum, decision makers should avoid choices that have high likelihoods of 
resulting in negative affect in favor of those with high likelihoods of producing positive af-
fective outcomes. From the point of view of the legal psychologist, it matters little wheth-
er this modifi ed rational choice approach deviates far enough from the traditional expect-
ed utility model to constitute a new model. Its contribution results from the extension of an 
existing rational logic model to include in the decision maker’s judgment calculus the reali-
ty of the affect that most certainly accompanies legal judgments and decisions. 
Consider two examples of the usefulness of such an “accommodated rational actor” model. 
First, we review a jury decision-making study in which a woman killed her husband and offered 
a self-defense theory based upon the fact that the deceased had regularly battered the woman 
for a number of years (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002). The authors set out to test the effect of battered 
woman syndrome on jury verdicts. Although prior research Schuller and Hastings (1996) demon-
strated that jurors were more lenient toward a woman defendant when her case included expert 
testimony about the battered woman syndrome, some legal commentators recommend caution in 
using the defense. They argue that if the defendant’s history of conduct is active and not passive, 
this defense could backfi re by showing a stark inconsistency with the helplessness that is central 
to battered spouse syndrome (Dobash & Dobash, 1984; Fischer, Vidmar, & Ellis, 1993). In addi-
1 Korobkin and Ulen (2001, p. 1051) formalize the rational actor model when they write, “The actor will pre-
sumably attach a utility to each possible outcome U(O1), U(O2), and so forth, along with a probability of each out-
come occurring p1, p2, and so on.” The decision maker then calculates the expected utility (EU) for each outcome 
or consequence, “EU (uncertain action) = p1U(O1)1 + p2U(O2) ... pnU(On)” and selects the choice with the great-
est expected utility. The utilities that the decision maker attaches to each outcome are “personal values” that refl ect 
changes in assets that result from choices and their outcomes or consequences (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). 
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tion, even if the defendant acted consistently with the battered woman pattern, the use of the term 
could offer a negative view of the defendant as dysfunctional and possibly emotionally disturbed 
(Browne, 1987; Crocker, 1985; Schneider, 1986). Although Schuller and Hastings challenged 
some of these beliefs with empirical data, prior to Schuller and Rzepa’s (1996) work, we knew 
very little about the way in which jurors reach decisions in cases that use the battered woman de-
fense. It should be clear to the casual observer that expected emotion in the form of sympathy for 
the defendant could play a critical role in battered women defense cases. 
Schuller and Rzepa (2002) manipulated the availability of the battered spouse defense by 
offering only half the mock jurors expert testimony about battered woman syndrome, in which 
the expert defi ned the condition as a special case of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with symp-
toms of avoidance, anxiety, and memory disorders. The testimony also depicted the Cycle The-
ory of Violence and the Theory of Learned Helplessness with Walker’s (1984) stages of “ten-
sion building,” “acute battering,” and “loving contrition.” The expert described the syndrome 
and testifi ed that those women who were long-time victims of battering would show height-
ened fear and would be more likely to experience imminent danger when confronted by an an-
gry spouse. Those mock jurors who did not receive this testimony still had the option of ac-
quitting the woman on the grounds of self-defense but did not have any reason to anticipate 
that the defendant had heightened fear and anxiety in the presence of her spouse. 
Half the participants read a case summary about a passive woman who did nothing to de-
fend herself against her husband’s battering (i.e., a woman whose conduct was consistent with 
the battered woman syndrome), whereas the other half learned that the defendant had active-
ly (verbally and physically) defended herself against the batterer. The active woman broke 
her husband’s arm with a baseball bat after a prior attack and on another occasion, she point-
ed a rifl e at his head and challenged his manliness after he had threatened her. Most impor-
tantly for the current discussion, half the jurors received radical nullifi cation jury instructions 
that told them that the law was not controlling and that they could ignore it if they thought the 
law would produce an unfair or unjust verdict in this case (Horowitz, 1988; see also Horowitz, 
Kerr, Park, & Gockel, 2006). The other half read only the regular instructions, which all the ju-
rors received. These instructions defi ned the burden of proof, standard of proof, and elements 
of the Canadian law for second-degree murder, manslaughter, and self-defense (justifi ed if the 
defendant had a “reasonable apprehension of death or bodily harm and believed on reasonable 
grounds that she could not otherwise protect herself” p. 656). 
Jurors completed a lengthy posttrial questionnaire, which among other questions, asked about 
the verdict (guilty of second-degree murder, manslaughter, or not guilty/self defense), sympa-
thy for the defendant, psychological stability of the defendant, and evaluations of the expert tes-
timony. The most interesting and important fi nding for the current discussion is the interaction 
of expert testimony and jury nullifi cation instructions on verdict. Specifi cally, more jurors in the 
battered woman testimony condition reached self-defense verdicts than did those without the tes-
timony, but they did so only when they operated under the radical nullifi ca tion instructions. One 
could argue that those jurors whom the researchers encouraged to disregard the law felt sympa-
thy for the defendant and therefore reached a not guilty verdict. These jurors may have anticipat-
ed feeling negative emotions (regret and perhaps guilt) if they had found the defendant guilty in 
the nullifi cation condition. To avoid those negative feelings, these jurors may have favored a self-
defense verdict over a second-degree murder or manslaughter verdict. In fact, Schuller and Rz-
epa (2002) reported a parallel two-way interaction between expert testimony and nullifi cation 
instructions, such that those exposed to battered woman expert testimony felt more sympathy to-
ward the defendant only when they operated under radical nullifi cation instruc tions. Taken to-
gether, these results suggest that the participants in this experiment who received nullifi cation in-
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structions and expert testimony about battered woman syndrome felt sympathy for the defendant. 
In accordance with the rational actor model modifi ed for affective outcomes, jurors may have 
reasoned that there was a high likelihood that if they found the woman guilty, their own sympa-
thy would have turned into the negative feelings of regret and self-guilt. These jurors may have 
acquitted the defendant to avoid these negative feeling state outcomes. 
This mechanism is, of course, not what the law of self-defense requires. If the jurors fol-
lowed the letter of the law and were convinced by the self-defense appeal, then they should 
have found the defendant not guilty in both the nullifi cation and traditional instruction con-
ditions. Under both types of instructions, the expert testimony should have been equally ef-
fective in convincing the jurors that the defendant was in reasonable apprehension of death 
or bodily harm, and that without a violent response she could not otherwise have protect-
ed herself. Instead, the jurors seemed to reach conclusions based upon the sympathy that 
the nullifi cation instruction intensifi ed and those jurors made subsequent efforts to avoid the 
likelihood of experiencing a negative affective outcome. 
Consider a second study in which researchers collected data to test the rational actor model 
more directly as it infl uences the decision whether or not to cheat on one’s income taxes (Wen-
zel, 2004). Here, the decision maker must decide whether to comply with the law and pay a cer-
tain amount of money (one’s tax bill) with a probability of monetary loss equal to 1.00 or to take a 
chance and evade paying all one’s taxes. There is, of course, a probability less than 1.00 that gov-
ernment accountants will detect the evasion and charge the payer the full amount plus a penal-
ty. On the other hand, there is a probability that the tax evasion will be successful (1.00 minus the 
likelihood of being caught) in which case the payer will gain the difference between paying the 
full amount of taxes and the amount that the payer actually sent to the government. One could ap-
ply an expected utility analysis (see earlier) and based upon the estimated probabilities and expect-
ed tax bills predict whether any given individual would pay the full bill or attempt tax evasion. 
Under such a system, the model predicts that tax compliance would increase as a func-
tion of the subjective certainty of detection and the size of the penalty that the system imposes 
for cheating. Therefore, deterring tax evasion would increase with more certain detection and 
greater monetary penalties for cheating. As Wenzel (2004) points out, the literature generally 
supports the deterrent effect of increasing certainty of detection and the size of penalties, but 
with the former effects more consistent than the latter (Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Varma & 
Doob, 1998) see Wenzel for a complete review of this literature). The asymmetry in these fi nd-
ings suggests researchers need to take into consideration other factors (especially with regard 
to valuing outcomes) in their models of tax compliance. Some data show that norms of moral-
ity and fairness (Scott & Grasmick, 1981; Wenzel, 2002) seem to moderate the effects of the 
expected utility logic especially when the metric of the outcomes remains economic self-inter-
est Wenzel. Although Grasmick and colleagues have demonstrated that emotion in the form of 
perceived guilt is one factor that lowers the valued outcome of successful tax evasion (Gras-
mick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick & Scott, 1982; Scott & Grasmick, 1981), the more current 
investigations have moved away from measures of emotions in favor of measures of justice 
norms. Although we applaud the consideration of justice norms in legal decision-making mod-
els, we wonder if researchers should also include emotional mediators in their work. 
Wenzel (2004) distinguished between two types of justice norms, personal norms (i.e., in-
dividuals’ standards of right and wrong, which they gain through identifi cation with a group) 
and social norms (i.e., a group’s standards of right and wrong imposed on an individual who 
does not necessarily identify with the group). Wenzel argued that when offi cials catch taxpay-
ers cheating, the cheaters suffer greater social costs when they are aware of the social norms 
against cheating even if they have lower personal norms against dishonesty. Taxpayers who 
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demonstrate higher social norms against cheating will anticipate greater negative affect (i.e., 
shame and em barrassment) at the prospect of their detection. As a result of the greater costs, 
Wenzel predicted social norms would moderate the deterrent effects of individuals’ perceptions 
of higher certainty of detection, higher likelihood of sanctions, and more severe sanctions. At 
the same time, he predicted that people with higher personal norms would simply not cheat be-
cause of their own internalized values. He expected deterrence effects only for individuals who 
held low personal norms against cheating. 
To test these predictions, Wenzel (2004) examined the self-reports of over 1400 Austra-
lian respondents who had completed Braithwaite’s (2000) Community Hopes, Fears, and 
Action survey. Eleven items that pertained to underreporting paid income, underreporting 
nonpaid income, and exaggerating deductions together measured tax compliance. Respon-
dents rated on several measures the likelihood of being caught cheating on a tax evasion 
scenario, the likelihood of sanctions for cheating on that scenario, and the severity of the 
sanctions that might result. A factor analysis produced one factor measuring the likelihood 
of sanctions and another measuring the severity of the sanctions. Finally, Wenzel measured 
social norms with questions asking the respondent what most people think about honesty 
in paying taxes and measured personal norms with questions asking what the respondent 
thought about honesty with respect to the same issues. 
Main effects from a regression analysis showed decreased tax evasion on the self-report 
compliance measure with increased ratings of likelihood of sanctions, severity of sanctions, and 
personal norms on the scenario task. Most importantly for the purpose of the present discussion, 
perceived severity of the consequences interacted signifi cantly with social norms in predicting 
tax evasion, such that increases in perceptions of the severity of the consequences were nega-
tively related to the likelihood of tax evasion for those with strong social norms against cheat-
ing but not for those with weak social norms. Further, a signifi cant interaction between severi-
ty of consequences and personal norms showed the exact opposite effect, severe sanctions were 
negatively associated with tax evasion, but only for those with weak personal norms. One in-
terpretation of these fi ndings is that the shame and embarrassment that taxpayers anticipate for 
getting caught cheating tips the scales against cheating for those with strong social norms be-
cause they wish to avoid the experience (reduce the likelihood) of those feelings in the future. 
Wenzel (2004, p. 561) concluded, “Sanction severity was only negatively related to tax evasion, 
and seemed to have a deterrence effect, when norms of tax honesty are perceived as strong, but 
where the norms were not internalized or incorporated into one’s social self through a process 
of social identifi cation.” We would argue that people with strong social norms but weak person-
al identifi cation with those norms are most likely to anticipate the embarrassment and shame 
that they would feel if they were caught cheating on their taxes and did not do so to avoid those 
negative feelings. In other words, the probability of experiencing negative affective outcomes 
(embarrassment and shame) were so high for these individuals that the expected utility of cheat-
ing decreased signifi cantly enough to deter them from practicing tax evasion. 
Unfortunately, this correlational data set did not allow any causal interpretations and it did 
not measure directly the participants’ shame and embarrassment. Of course, the latter issue 
is our interest and not the interest of the original researcher. Still, we suspect that the lack of 
emotional measures in this research and other studies results from researchers’ willingness to 
accept the rational choice model without considering the role that anticipated emotion can play 
in its calculus. Although we cannot be certain if anticipated emotion mediated Wenzel’s (2004) 
effects, we are certain that including emotional constructs in the expected utility model and in-
cluding measures of emotion in legal decision-making studies have great potential to produce 
important and interesting mediators in legal psychology. 
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The lens model 
A second major model for judgment and decision making employs human perception as its ba-
sic analogy, rather than an economic model, to describe the ways in which decision makers ac-
tually make judgments and decisions. The formal depiction of legal judgments that the lens 
model affords offers a way to isolate the likely infl uence of experienced affect on legal judg-
ment and decision making. The lens model is a generally accepted framework for capturing 
the values and weights that decision makers assign to informational inputs (Hastie & Dawes, 
2001, p. 49). Although there are a number of statistical procedures that researchers can and do 
use to measure the parameters that make up the lens model framework, the basic relationships 
that it describes between judgment inputs and outputs offered at a conceptual level go a long 
way to illustrate some of the mechanics of how people use environmental input to reach spe-
cifi c judgments and decisions. It is not diffi cult to expand the lens model to take into consider-
ation the role of affect experienced at the time of the judgment on legal decision making. 
The lens model is a conceptual framework for describing the relationship between the in-
formation or cues in the external world, their representations in memory, and the judgments 
or decisions that people reach by considering those cues (Hammond, 2000a, 200b; Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001). The name of the framework comes from the realization that people draw infer-
ences about the external world, which they cannot really ever know, from imperfect sources of 
information. It is through this imperfect perceptual lens that decision makers ultimately make 
judgments and predictions. Figure 1 is a conceptual replication of the model, borrowed from 
Hastie and Dawes and others before them (e.g. Brunswik, 1952). 
One legal context in which researchers have examined stressful arousal is eyewitness memory 
(see, e.g. Stein, Ornstein, Tversky, & Brainerd, 1997), where researchers have shown stress but 
not specifi c emotions have generally negative effects (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & Mc-
Gorty, 2004). We illustrate the parameters of the lens model with an example from eyewitness 
memory in a criminal context. Here, an investigator asks whether a witness to an illegal activity 
observed specifi c actions and events that could have made up the illegal action. Although the lens 
model approach is useful for analyzing a number of eyewitness effects during the encoding, post-
event, and retrieval stages, we focus on the misinformation effect or the incorporation of suggest-
ed information that the observer did not actually see during the encoding process (see, e.g. Ger-
rie, Garry, & Loftus, 2005), for review). More specifi cally, we use the lens model to examine 
how experienced affect infl uences the manner in which a witness might utilize cue probabilities 
to judge whether they observed specifi c actions, events, and situations during the encoding pro-
cess. Figure 1 applies the lens model to the misinformation effect in eyewitness identifi cation. 
Loftus (1979) conducted a series of infl uential experiments in which misinformation was in-
troduced to eyewitnesses in the form of post-event misleading questions, very much like those 
that an investigator might ask a witness after the onlooker observed a criminal act. The issue 
for the witness is to judge the likelihood that each of the cues (some gathered during encod-
ing and others gathered post-event through investigator suggestion) was actually part of the “to 
be described event.” The work of Loftus and others showed that people tended to confabulate 
their reports infusing the misinformation into their accounts of the actual crime scene (Loftus, 
Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989). Although several authors discuss the implications of the 
misinformation effect in legal decision making especially during the investigatory and adjudi-
cation processes (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Ross, Read, & Toglia, 1994; Wells & Loftus, 2003), 
others qualify the importance of the phenomenon because they do not always fi nd strong misin-
formation effects. Some suggest that the misinformation effect is mutable and depends upon the 
strength of the memory traces involved (Pezdek & Roe, 1995; Reyna & Loyd, 1997). Some re-
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searchers suggest that the effect is largely a problem of information source monitoring (Lind-
say & Johnson, 1989a, 1989b) and still others view the problem as one that is most problemat-
ic when the observers are subject to social suggestion (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In any 
event, there is continued interest in the misinformation effect and in identifying both moderators 
and mediators for its occurrence (Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005). 
The lens model (Hammond, 2000a, 2000b; Hastie & Dawes, 2001) suggests a variable rela-
tionship among informational cues that eyewitnesses gather from the environment as they try 
to judge the likelihood that each cue was actually part of the original crime scene. Figure 1 
depicts a judgment task for an assault that Forgas, Laham, and Vargas (2005, Experiment 2) 
staged in a uni versity lecture hall to study the impact of experienced affect on the misinfor-
mation effect. Here, a female intruder walked into a lecture hall and assaulted the lecturer. The 
left side of the diagram shows the distal property in the environment that the witness seeks to 
describe, and the right side of the diagram refl ects the psychological processes that result in a 
fi nal judgment about the as sault. There was a staged (ostensibly a real) assault and some of the 
cues associated with it in the observers’ memories came from their observation of the event 
(i.e., the lecturer removed the mi crophone as the offender approached and the offender fi ddled 
with her scarf as she approached). However, other events were not part of the scene. Instead, 
the researchers provided misinfor mation as part of a post-event questionnaire that asked mis-
leading questions, the information in italics (e.g., “Did you see the lecturer removing his mi-
crophone, as the woman wearing a light jacket moved towards him?” and “Can you remember 
the young woman fi ddling with her scarf as the lecturer gave her something from his wallet?” 
p. 380). For other observers the post-event ques tionnaire asked only direct questions that de-
scribed accurately events that occurred in the crime scene (e.g., “Did you see the lecturer re-
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moving his microphone as the woman approached?” “Can you remember the young woman 
fi ddling with her scarf as the lecturer spoke to her?” p. 380). 
For the eyewitness, the problem is to assess the cue validities (the likelihood that they ac-
tually came from the crime scene), form a fi nal description of the crime scene, and accurate-
ly report that description to the experimenters (or to the police in a real investigation). The ac-
curacy of the eyewitness depends upon two important parameters in the model, the ecological 
validities (i.e., the relationship between the external reality and cues stored in memory) and the 
cue utilization rates (i.e., the ability of the decision maker to review these cues and make judg-
ments about the environmental reality of each). In this case, the eyewitness will only be able 
to make an accurate assessment if the evidence is accurate and the eyewitness is able to weigh 
the evidence appropriately (according to the ecological validity associated with the cues) to 
reach an accurate judgment. The questions of importance are, “What are the relationships be-
tween the recalled cues and the criminal event the way it actually occurred (ecological cue va-
lidities from Fig. 1)? Secondly, do the eyewitnesses reliably use this information to assess ac-
curately the events that took place during the assault (cue utilizations from Fig. 1)?” 
Forgas et al. (2005) hypothesized that the experienced affect of eyewitnesses at the time 
of their observations can play an important role as a moderator of the misinformation effect. 
Once again, Experiment 2 tested this by staging an unexpected assault on a lecturer in class 
and then presenting a brief questionnaire 1 week later that for half of the participants includ-
ed direct questions and for the other half, misleading questions about the assault. However, 
just prior to introducing the post-event questionnaire, the researchers manipulated the mood 
of the participants (i.e., happy, neutral, or sad) by showing them one of the three videos pre-
tested to produce those affective states. After the eyewitnesses participated in a series of dis-
tracter tasks, they answered several more questions about the crime scene. The questions in-
cluded correct details (information that observers saw in the criminal episode but that they 
did not read about in the direct or misleading questionnaire), misleading details (i.e., incor-
rect information observers read in the misleading questionnaire but did not see in the crim-
inal episode), and incorrect details (i.e., incorrect information that they did not see in the 
criminal episode or read about in the questionnaire). 
Results showed a false alarm effect (Forgas et al., 2005) for participants in happy moods 
(induced through the video). Those who answered the misleading version of the brief question-
naire were more likely to describe the crime scene with misleading details as compared to hap-
py participants who answered the direct version of the brief questionnaire. This was also true, 
but to a lesser extent, for those participants in neutral moods. Finally, for those participants in 
sad moods, the difference in false recall of misleading details was not signifi cantly different in 
the misleading questionnaire version as compared to the direct questionnaire version. Forgas et 
al. interpreted these results to support one of their main hypotheses, that negative moods trig-
ger accommodative processing focusing on the actual details of the environment, whereas pos-
itive moods trigger assimilative and constructive processing, which integrates existing knowl-
edge, heuristics, and schematic thinking into task details. 
A lens model interpretation suggests that participants in a happy mood were less sensitive 
to the ecological validities of the cues than were people in sad moods, or that those in hap-
py moods did a poor job of cue integration relying more heavily on the misleading cues intro-
duced post-event than those gathered at the time of the actual observation. That is, the happy 
moods and even neutral moods distorted the decision makers’ representations of the images 
recorded in the lens. Use of the lens model to depict the judgment problem points out the im-
portance of determining whether experienced emotion infl uenced the judgments through cue 
validity calculations, cue utilization rates, or cue integration operations and whether such in-
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fl uences occurred consciously or unconsciously. Once again, although we are unable to an-
swer these questions from the Forgas et al. data, we are able to ask some interesting and im-
portant questions about legal judgment and decision making by using a general judgment 
model to depict the task parameters. The lens model directs nicely the application of theories 
of affect to the problem of eyewitness identifi cation. 
Affect and generic models of legal decision making 
We have tried to show with detailed examples how existing models can accommodate the role 
of affect in legal decision making. We now advocate for the use of these approaches to clari-
fy how researchers ought to consider emotion when they study legal judgments and decisions. 
We conclude with a discussion of the advantages of modifying existing approaches to informa-
tion processing to include the infl uence of affect on how legal actors make choices among op-
tions and reach judgments about law and legal process. 
First, a general model approach to the study of affect in legal decision making allows for spe-
cifi c interactions among context, decision-maker attributes, emotional reactions and the law. As 
we have seen in each of the previous examples, expressing the legal decision-making problem as 
a general model pinpoints potential relationships in which context, affect, and decision-maker at-
tributes moderate (and sometimes mediate) the effects of law on judgments and choices. Some-
times, merely viewing the decision problem as an expected utility problem or as a lens model 
makes salient some of the relationships among the elements of the task that were not readily ap-
parent. For example, Schuller and Rzepa’s (2002) results clearly show that the use of battered 
woman syndrome testimony as a viable defense, at least in a homicide case, requires that the ju-
rors have a great deal of leeway in their interpretation of the law. Under a radical nullifi cation in-
struction, jurors show heightened sympathy with the defendant and are more likely to fi nd the de-
fendant not guilty by reason of self defense. However, applying an expected utility logic to the 
jury decision-making task requires that jurors choose not to fi nd the woman guilty of homicide 
because they fi nd the probability of a negative consequence associated with that outcome lower 
in value than the probability of a negative consequence associated with the guilty outcome. Only 
when the jurors are free to choose the verdict unencumbered by the constraints of the law do they 
allow themselves to feel sympathy for the victim of spousal abuse. 
What might that outcome be that is so aversive that jurors are willing to distort the law of 
self-defense to eliminate the defendant’s responsibility for her husband’s death? If we are will-
ing to attach value to anticipated emotion, there is the interesting possibility that jurors who 
feel sympathy for the defendant are trying to avoid the negative emotion that they would feel 
if they were responsible for convicting a woman toward whom they felt such strong emotions. 
Under the guiding light of emotion infused expected utility theory, we fi nd that rational choice 
can account for what might appear at fi rst as an irrational choice. Future research that adopts 
this type of affective rational choice model has the potential to add greatly to our understand-
ing of legal decision making in a variety of dispute resolution contexts, including the typical 
jury decision-making task, which legal psychologists study so commonly. 
Second, the use of expected utility theory and the lens model to depict legal judgment and 
decision-making models points out the possible roles of affect for future research (see also Ma-
roney, 2006). We maintain that using a general model depiction of the decision or judgment task 
makes apparent the potential mediating and moderating roles of affect as decision makers an-
ticipate or experience it at the time of the judgment. For example, Wenzel (2004)made use of 
survey data that Braithwaite collected from Australian taxpayers to demonstrate that strong ex-
ternal social norms coupled with weak internalized values can increase the deterrent value of se-
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vere sanctions. Nonetheless, these data offer very little in the way of psychological explanation, 
other than stating that potential offenders with strong social norms held externally should act to 
avoid the shame and embarrassment that violating the law would bring. However, examining 
the problem as one of the anticipated affective consequences suggests that under these condi-
tions taxpayers attach special signifi cance to the detection of cheating because of the negative-
ly valenced emotions that they anticipate experiencing as probable outcomes of their choice to 
cheat. The affective version of the expected utility model raises the interesting possibility that 
anticipated embarrassment or shame is a mediator in the deterrent effect of the high likelihood 
of severe consequences for illegal behavior. Understanding this mediation effect in choices that 
people make with regard to law violation could be an important factor in developing interven-
tions to increase compliance with tax laws and other self-guided legal judgments. 
Similarly, the application of the lens model to legal judgment tasks raises some interesting 
moderator effects that experienced emotions could play in legal decision making. For exam-
ple, Forgas et al. (2005) demonstrated that one moderator of the misinformation effect in eye-
witness identifi cation is the emotion that the witnesses experience when they are exposed to 
suggestive in formation. Witnesses experiencing positive emotions show more evidence of the 
misinformation effect than do those experiencing negative affect. By itself, this is an interest-
ing fi nding but de picting the misinformation paradigm as a lens model problem also points out 
that the explanation for the moderating effect of affective valence could operate in either of 
the two ways. First, it could alter the observers’ abilities to estimate the ecological validity of 
the cues (i.e., whether they are related to the actual experienced event) or it could infl uence the 
way in which the witness integrates a number of cues properly to produce an accurate descrip-
tion of the crime scene. The use of the lens model points out some specifi c mechanisms that 
might be responsible for the role of emotion as a moderator for the misinformation effect. 
Finally, as we have pointed out there are a number of theoretical accounts of the ways in 
which emotion might generally infl uence choice and judgment, including the role of anticipat-
ed affect (Mellers, 2000; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, et al., 1997; Mellers et al., 1999), experienced 
emotion (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), affect as information (Schwarz, 
1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic et al., 2002), and affect as a memory prime (19). General 
models of choice and judgment such as the two illustrated here are fl exible enough to accom-
modate a number of affective theories. In the early stages of studying the role of affect in le-
gal decision making, this fl exibility invites researchers to try out different affective theories to 
help explain the outcomes of legal choice or judgment. Although the degrees of freedom that 
allow the use of different theories of emotion to account for legal choices and judgments may 
dry up as more and more data limit the ability of these models to provide parsimonious expla-
nations of legal judgments, at the current stage of analysis the fl exibility of the more general 
models offers heuristic research paradigms. 
Conclusion 
For too long psychologists studying legal decision making have ignored the obvious and insist-
ed upon studying eyewitness identifi cation, jury decision making, compliance with the law, judi-
cial decision making, and many other types of legal judgments, as if they occurred in the absence 
of emotion and motivation. As a result, there are few examples of empirical investigations of law 
and legal process that make use of either general or specifi c theories of emotion applied to judg-
ment and decision making. In this article, we have pointed out how we can adopt existing mod-
els of judgment and decision making that are familiar to legal psychologists to study the role of 
emotion in legal contexts. Using three recently published examples of legal decision making that 
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fi nd results that, at least, suggest the importance of anticipated and experienced emotions, we 
have shown how modifying the rational choice and lens models to accommodate these theories 
offers important insights into legal decision making and judgment. We believe that the usefulness 
of this approach to emotions in the law is limited only by the creativity of the psycholegal schol-
ar and hope that this exercise will encourage others to include affective constructs, measures, and 
manipulations in their legal decision-making research. 
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